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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Land ownership in Guatemala’s northern Department of the
Petén has never followed an orderly or controlled process.
For several decades, the land has been occupied and then
divided amongst the invaders themselves; only later has the
government attempted to provide some sense of legality to
the ownership. Despite the efforts of the Guatemalan
government to develop the Petén as a sort of American-style
manifest destiny, where it was believed that the Petén had to
be conquered to provide wealth that would magically bring
millions of peasants out of poverty, expectations of land
wealth for peasants have proven illusory. Instead, large
enterprises dominated the farm lands and have been
cultivating African palms in the region for decades.1 And
now drug trafficking groups are buying land, mainly from
illegal owners, for money laundering and other illicit
activities. While there are no updated, reliable land registry
records in the Petén Department, available data shows that
significant ownership changes have occurred within
municipalities such as San José and La Libertad, with a 90
percent change in ownership from 2005 to 2010.
Petén’s rapid increase in crime, which includes human
trafficking, followed the retreat of the Guatemalan army after
the signing of the 1996 Peace Accords. Until then, the army
had been the only state institution with a presence in the
region. Now, however, Guatemala’s main drug trafficking
families, the Mendozas and the Lorenzanas, have
considerable influence in Petén.2 And making matters
1

Data from the Palmicultores of Guatemala Association
(GREPALMA) show the returns of said crop in the country are the
highest in the world, making it the most attractive agro-crop for new
investments.
2
The presence of narcotraffickers is, according to officials in charge of
developing the land registry, the principal reason they cannot complete
their work. In numerous places they have been pressured to abandon their
activities.
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worse, the Mexican Zetas have created their own fiefdom in
the city of Cobán (located just south of Petén, in the
Department of Alta Verapaz), and have essentially turned it
into an enclave that lies amongst other DTO’s territories.
While there are still no clear indications that the Zetas
themselves are purchasing lands in Petén, numerous
squatters are often found functioning as advance-guard for
the drug dealers; they prevent the authorities from entering,
warn of intrusions, and clear land that the drug cartels
ultimately take over. 3

3

Schmidt, Blake, ―Ranchers and Drug Barons Threaten Forest Once
Ruled by the Maya,‖ New York Times, July 17, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/world/americas/18guatemala.html?
_r=2&ref=world.
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Source: http://www.google.com/

THE PROMISED LAND
Petén is located in the northern region of Guatemala,
bordering Mexico and Belize. It occupies 35,854 square
kilometers, has little more than 613,000 inhabitants, and is
larger than the Republic of El Salvador (20,742 square
kilometers).4 The capital of the Department, where the
centers of government are situated, is located in the Flores
Island, around 500 kilometers away from Guatemala City.
Petén is famous for the Tikal ruins, the location of the main
city of the Mayan civilization.

4
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After several centuries of natural life, the disappearance of
the Mayan civilization and the scarce interest of the Spanish
colonizers in resettling the land due to the inhospitable
nature of the jungle, Petén radically and rapidly began to
change as a result of major migration flows, mainly
consisting of landless peasants coming from other zones of
Guatemala in the 1960s.5 Various Guatemalan
administrations encouraged the settling process for the
purpose of providing an escape valve for the social pressures
resulting from scarcity of productive land and accelerated
growth of the rural population. For this reason, Petén was
considered as a sort of American style Wild West – to be
conquered with the hopes of providing wealth that would
magically bring millions of peasants out of poverty.
The distribution of land went through different stages and
priorities, with uneven results. In the 1970’s, the Promotion
and Development of Petén (FYDEP) corporation managed
the distribution of land as if it were a large farm. In the
1980’s, the National Army used it for counterinsurgency
purposes – in cooperation with United States counter
insurgency (COIN) programs conducted in Central America
during the height of the Cold War.
Since the 1990’s the Protection of the Rainforest of Petén
Program, the Ministry of Agriculture (MAGA),
PROSELVA, the National Fund for Peace (FONAPAZ) and
the National Fund for Land (FONTIERRA) have all acted
with both conservationist and political intentions, but
without unified criteria of beneficiaries’ selection or land
distribution and without providing beneficiaries with
technical or financial assistance to help cultivate or develop
the land.6 As an example, FYDEP transferred a significant
5

Instituto Nacional de Estadística
For a critical view of the FONTIERRA paper refer to the Agrarian
Platform presentation in the Global Forum on Agrarian Reform,
Valencia, Spain, 2004.
6
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number of people from the Pacific Ocean coast to prevent
peasants’ pressure on the big cotton, sugar and banana
plantations. Later, FONAPAZ encouraged the mobilization
of entire towns that survived the internal armed conflict in
the Department of Alta Verapaz, mainly the municipalities of
Raxruhá, Fray Bartolomé de las Casas and Chisec, after the
Army organized the majority of the existing communities by
forcing inhabitants to live close to each other to control their
movements and to prevent them from giving logistical
support to guerrilla organizations.
The land acquisitions process was never orderly or
controlled, it was more of an anarchical and improvised
process often referred to as the ―land grab.‖ In the majority
of cases, the peasants arrived on their own account and the
land distribution was carried out through agreements
between the invaders themselves. Later, the government
institutions arrived to adjust properties and more importantly
to legalize property ownership.7
DISENCHANTMENT
Expectations of fertile lands and great agricultural wealth
proved false; the good harvests lasted only the first two or
three years, followed by a notable decline in land fertility.
The demolished jungle resulted in terrain with low corn
yields that ended up as cattle pastures requiring little labor.
In no time, the population of the region began to get hired as
temporary workers who migrated to other zones of the
country, repeating the poverty cycle from which they tried to
escape.

7

According to the Pastoral Social del Vicariato Apostólico of Petén
(Catholic Church), the informality and irregularities in the land allocation
process is very well known by the narcotraffickers, and they take
advantage in forcing the poor farmers to sell their lands.
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Another factor that changed colonization was the assumption
that the region had big mineral deposits, similar to the nickel
ones in neighboring departments. During the 1970’s and
1980’s, this attracted influential military and political leaders
who began to appropriate land with the hope of obtaining
benefits from these ―magical‖ resources. Thus, plundering
and occupation of land were common practice. Ultimately,
Spanish, French and American companies began oil
exploration and exploitation operations with poor results in
the midst of protests by displaced peasants and the pollution
of their main sources of living. 8
These events allowed insurgent organizations like the
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) in the southern zone, and
primarily, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) in the northern
zone to achieve a strong presence in the Department.
Between 1978 and 1983, the war had a great impact on the
Department due to constant warfare, massacres and the
subsequent exodus of the population. Like in other areas of
Guatemala, the inhabitants of Petén were forced to make a
choice: enroll in the Guatemalan National Revolutionary
Unity (URNG), the united structure of the guerrilla
movement, or in the Civil Self Defense Patrols (PAC),
organized by the Army. This had such an impact that even
today both sides constitute the origin of the local political
leadership, expressed by the polarization between the present
political party in power, the National Unity of Hope (UNE),
and the Patriotic Party. It is almost certain that they will
compete for the Presidency of the Republic in the September
2011 elections.

8

Perspectives from the ―anti-globalization‖ left:
http://www.aselobs.org/contents/elobservadorno.7.pdf. and
http://www.oilwatchmesoamerica.org/index.php?option=com_content&t
ask=view&id=2647&Itemid=78.
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CATTLE RANCHING OR GROWING AFRICAN PALM
The end of the war brought the arrival of new human
contingents, especially returning refugees from Mexico. But
the lack of soil fertility was a well-known phenomenon and
it accelerated the process of land reconversion into new
activities. Options to survive and escape from poverty were
scarce. For this reason, many peasants tried to start cattle
ranching activities on their own or sold their properties to
farmers from the Eastern zone of the country (the
Departments of Zacapa and Chiquimula) that had experience
in cattle ranching on lands with low fertility levels. Only
those that incorporated forests preservation programs,
supported by United States’ NGOs, were slightly successful
in improving their living conditions.
Almost at the same time, national agro industrial enterprises
previously growing African palm in the southern zone of the
country as a substitute for cotton plantations offered to buy
large expanses of land to increase their production. Given
that the sense of ownership in the zone has never developed
and the prevalent criterion was that the land was not
productive, there was a literal ―fever‖ to get rid of land.
Peasants who sold their land to the palm producing
enterprises faced the dilemma of working on their old
properties for new owners or moving to the northern zone of
Petén (already declared a protected area) to invade state
owned land with the hope that, again, the government in
power would legalize their ownership. A significant number
of peasants chose the latter and began a new stage in the
uncontrollable taking over of state owned land and
environmental destruction.

7

THE ARMY RETREATS
The swift changes in land property in Petén took place
within the context of institutional reforms contained in the
Peace Agreement signed in 1996 between the government of
President Alvaro Arzú and the opposition URNG that
brought about, among other aspects, the drastic reduction of
the Army that until then had been the State institution with
the most presence in the Department. The Civilian National
Police (PNC), organized to take care of citizen security, was
never able to provide sufficient manpower or the operational
capacity to cover the vacuum left by the military. 9
The first impact of the retreat of the Army was, like in other
zones of Guatemala, a rapid and unstoppable increase in
crime, especially directed—in the case of Petén—to the
stealing of cattle that was moved to Mexico through
hundreds of unchecked border crossings. Later, smugglers
of agricultural and industrial products came and moved from
the border area on the Pacific Ocean due to existing facilities
and human traffickers from all over Central America who
tried to illegally enter the United States. The impact was of
such magnitude that zones like the neighboring state of
Tabasco in Mexico began to be invaded by all kinds of
contraband and in no time criminal gangs tried to control it.
TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION
While the Army was present in Petén, drug trafficking
activity was not very visible and remained limited to the
―unchecked locations‖ largely along the Mexican border for
the shipping of drugs. Even when they knew that there were
9

The new PNC was organized through a recycling process of its previous
members which represented the continuation of corruption practices and
a feeling of distrust—that still persists—from the population. That
weakness has been taken advantage of, for example, by narcotraffickers
to ―buy‖ protection.
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few military officers who did not have enough equipment to
control their activities, drug traffickers never tried to increase
their activity or question military authority. However, there
were accusations that some officers provided protection to
drug traffickers.
After the military literally abandoned Petén, one of the local
main drug trafficking groups, the Mendoza family, moved
there from the Department of Izabal, along the border with
Honduras and leaving the Lorenzana family in charge of that
area, in an orderly and calm process that led to the friendly
distribution of northern and eastern regions of the country. It
should be pointed out that the participation of these families
in drug trafficking was a gradual process encouraged by the
Colombian cartels who needed to guarantee drug shipping
routes to Mexico by land. The cartels first used several local
government officials (mayors) and landlords from areas
bordering Honduras and El Salvador and later, they used
only groups (families) who offered them the best protection
services.10
The Mendoza family specialized in ensuring aerial shipments
from Colombia to Petén while the Lorenzana family stayed
in the Department of Izabal and was in charge of land
shipments from Costa Rica and Panama that later transited
Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador. The internal routes
did not provoke conflict since the latter used the northern
part of the Departments of Huehuetenango and Quiché for
their shipments to Chiapas, Mexico, while the former took
total control of Petén and the shipments via Tabasco and
Campeche. Other groups specialized in protecting the
shipments by sea, taking advantage of the military’s
10

In a study conducted by the Secretaria de Análisis Estratégico (SAE)
in 1987 pointed out that the narcotraffickers preferred an ―understanding‖
with the municipal mayors to obtain territorial security and they did not
wish to do it with the national government, which members they
considered extremely corrupt.

9

incapacity to protect the large coastline along the Pacific
Ocean.
THE NEED TO BUY LAND FOR MONEY LAUNDERING
Guatemalan drug trafficking groups have faced a challenge
in that the entrepreneurial sector has totally opposed any
association with them. They have been forced to operate in
relatively rural areas like Petén, Zacapa, San Marcos,
Huehuetenango and Alta Verapaz where no one questions
their money’s legitimacy and are socially recognized and
protected by the poorest sector of the population who
consider them as modern ―Robin Hoods‖ because they
offered them services (such as health, education and
security) that the State has never provided. In October 2010,
for example, the capture of a drug dealer, Mauro Salomón
Rodríguez, who operated on the Pacific coast, led to public
protests in support by the nearby communities that praised
him for creating jobs and building schools.11
The impossibility of joining sectors dominating agriculture,
banking or traditional services motivated, for example, the
Lorenzana family to begin their own agricultural activities
such as melon growing for export to the United States
market. For this reason, they bought land in the Departments
of Zacapa, Izabal and Chiquimula and also entered politics
by supporting former president Alfonso Portillo (originally
from Zacapa and currently in the process of extradition to
United States for money laundering charges) which allowed
them to open their own regional bank that subsequently went
bankrupt and was rescued by the same government,
purchasing its laundered capital.
11

Galeano, Gladys, ―Manifestación a favor de Mauro Salomón
Rodríguez,‖ El Periódico (Guatemala), October 9, 2010.
http://www.elperiodico.com.gt/es/20101009/pais/178447/.
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On the other hand, the Mendoza family did the same and
began to buy large plots of land supposedly for cattle
ranching. In reality it was for money laundering purposes
that could only be done in the large plains of Petén, given
that the availability of land in the rest of the country was
practically nonexistent, either because the land was already
owned by traditional agricultural sectors or by hundreds of
small landowners whose property was not large enough for
that purpose.
Taking into consideration the scarcity of land, the agreement
of the ―good neighbors‖ was again put into practice: the
Mendoza family monopolized the municipalities on the north
of Petén (especially San José, where they had their
headquarters and controlled the local government) and
allowed the Lorenzana family to buy land on the south of the
Department (municipality of Sayaxché). However, they
arrived late to this zone because the African palm companies
have already purchased all ―legal‖ land, meaning land from
owners who had valid documents to buy it.
Narcotraffickers, located in southern Petén, purchased as
much land as possible (mainly illegal land) in order to
conduct illicit money laundering activities, largely through
cattle ranching activity. As happened with other illegal land
acquisitions, the cartels hoped that the State would end up
granting documents that would legitimize their ownership.
The purchase of land almost always took place under death
threats.12 The illegality of the invaders’ property seizures
makes them vulnerable to pressure from cartels.

12

The group of NGOs that work on the topic of agrarian conflict in Petén
have denounced that the state is aware of this situation and does not act
to prevent the extortion that the farmers are suffering.
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DEPARTMENT OF PETEN

Source: http://www.larutamayaonline.com/guatemala/maps/index.php

Some drug traffickers have planted their own African palms,
attempting to capitalize on already developed industries. In
other cases they have used, without owners’ authorization,
some of the many landing strips that exist in this large zone
with limited road infrastructure. In the north, the Mendoza
family used the same procedure to takeover land, pressuring
peasants who have invaded the Mayan biosphere after selling
their land on south of Petén and especially those who lived in
zones adjacent to the Tiger Lagoon. As their land occupation
was not legal, the peasants could not oppose the drug
traffickers’ pressure, which then used the lands for money
laundering --by buying large cattle ranches-- and for safe
landing areas for aircraft coming from Colombia.
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THE ARRIVAL OF THE ZETAS
Due to ongoing internal divisions, the relationship between
five of the most important drug trafficking groups (Mendoza
and Lorenzana on the north and the east, and Chamalé,
Serceño and Luciano cartels on the south and west) gradually
deteriorated. Also, the theft of drug shipments among them
led to distrust and a sense that the rules of non-aggression
and coexistence were no longer in place. Personalities like
Juancho León, who was married to a member of the
Lorenzana family and attempted to create his own cartel, was
violently murdered by the well-known Mexican Zetas, who
were hired by traditional drug trafficking families in 2008.13
This event proved transcendental since the Zetas did not
leave the area after finishing their ―job‖ and instead,
attempted to gain control of drug trafficking routes in
Guatemala and Central America. Through indiscriminate
violence against all existing groups to date, the Zetas have
created their own fiefdom in the city of Cobán (the
Department of Alta Verapaz), a strategic location near Petén
(to the north), Izabal, Zacapa, Chiquimula and Baja Verapaz
(to the center and east) as well as Quiché (to the west), and
turned it into an enclave within other groups’ territories. The
Zetas, based in Mexico’s northeastern border area, founded
by Mexican former Special Forces troops, broke off from the
Gulf Cartel. They began operating in the Petén in 2009 and
have fought fierce battles with Guatemalan security forces. 14

13

On Juan Leon’s paper and the implications of his death, see:
http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/Denuncian-patrullajes-hombresarmados_0_385161521.html.
14
Tim Johnson, ―Mexican narcos gain foothold in Guatemalan jungle,‖
McClatchy Newspapers, November 1, 2010.
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/10/27/102726/mexican-narcos-gainfoothold-in.html.
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So far the Zetas have not shown any interest in purchasing
land, however, if they were to take possession of land from
any of the local families they would automatically become
land owners in the Petén region. It seems that their main
motives would be to operate and develop infrastructure to
support drug routes destined for the United States. Many of
the other land owners in Petén, from those with large
extensions of African palms to small cattle ranchers; have
little or no direct relationship with the Zetas. The locals seem
to be aware of the level of violence associated with the Zetas
and appear apprehensive about getting involved in their
operations.
THE UNCONTROLLED VARIABLE
In the midst of the current economic dynamism in the Petén
due primarily to the growing of African palm and drug
trafficking, there is also a factor not seen in other similar
areas. That is, the accelerated population growth of the
q’eqchi’ ethnic group that, until recently, had been almost
exclusively based on the Department of Alta Verapaz and
Izabal as well as the south of Petén. Contrary to what
happens with other groups (quichés, kakchiqueles and
mames) which are gradually facing a population decline as a
result of their relationships with non-indigenous cultures, the
q’eqchi’ group is experiencing a population growth that
could turn Petén, Belize and Tabasco (Mexico) into mainly
Mayan speaking areas in no more than two generations (forty
years).
Local sources explain this accelerated process of population
and territorial growth with the following: ―q’eqchi’s are
content with having a water source nearby, a fertile land for
corn production and then they will settle; when the soil of the
region is not fertile they just simply abandon it.‖
In any case, the q’eqchi’ growth adds another factor to the
zone’s complexity. It could be speculated that if any of the
14

drug trafficking groups realizes this phenomenon, they could
try to use it in their favor, either to gain protection or to
encourage the development of an autonomous zone that
would comprise areas of Guatemala such as Petén and the
Campeche, Tabasco and Chiapas areas of Mexico; where
neither of the states have a strong institutional presence or
border control.
LAND PROPERTY CHANGE DATA
The Department of Petén does not have a reliable and
updated land registry due to its expansive territory, the lack
of resources to manage it and the need for drug trafficking to
keep records ambiguous. Due to these factors, it is
impossible to have precise and updated information
regarding land property changes. However, available data
shows that the changes in ownership are significant in
municipalities such as San José and La Libertad (Mendoza
family) as well as Sayaxché (Lorenzana family). This may
suggest that drug trafficking families or groups are acquiring
territory in the area.15

15

Based on interviews that the author has held with families and
organizations throughout the region.
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PETÉN: CHANGE IN REGISTERED LAND PROPERTY
(2005 – 2010)
Per
Municipality Urban area Rural area Total
Cent of
change
Flores
8,685
1,147
9,832
29
San José
2,417
316
2,733
75
San Benito
13,994
76
14,070 32
San Andrés 3,379
986
4,365
35
La Libertad
San
Francisco
Santa Ana
Dolores
San Luis
Sayaxché
Melchor
Poptún

7,283

6,661

13,944

69

4,672

557

5,229

23

6,873
5,418
2,779
3,456
4,459
11,129
74,544

1,320
2,095
4,154
5,587
496
494
23,889

8,193
7,513
6,933
9,043
4,955
11,623
98,433

20
15
33
90
12
18

Source: Land Registry (RIC) of the Department of Petén, 2010.

CONCLUSION
Exacerbating the underlying socio-economic, political,
cultural, and environmental complexities of the Department
of Petén is the arrival of narcotraffickers. Their presence and
growth corresponds to patterns of property change that have
been observed in the region. The Guatemalan government
lacks sufficient authority to control the region’s land
acquisitions, and has historically viewed and treated the
region as a ―drain‖ for the tensions that take place in the
broader Guatemalan State, rather than provide a strategy to
improve the living conditions of its citizens.

16

Until now the Zetas have made sporadic incursions into
Petén from their base of operations in the Department of Alta
Verapaz as they have attempted to gain control of the drug
routes that traverse from El Salvador and Honduras to
Mexico. However, they have yet to permanently establish
themselves in society. News of their violence is widely
known, so the population in Petén will be apprehensive in
openly supporting or accepting their activities.
The absence of the Guatemalan government in the region is
affording the opportunity for narcotraffickers and cartels to
fill socio-economic and security voids – education, health
services, infrastructure development, and security.
If
successful, and if groups like the Zetas permanently settle in
the region, a transfer of legitimacy from the State to the
cartels could take place, making the region much more
dangerous and unmanageable. However, in contrast to what
is known of southern Mexico, where drug cartels are
dominant actors who impose their wills on the rest of
society, in Petén narcotraffickers arrived – same as other
groups in the past – in search of personal security,
tranquility, and gains. Just like those seeking land or
displaced by the armed conflict, the narcotraffickers arrived
thinking they would ―magically‖ secure both their individual
and personal heirs’ futures by using the land to achieve
wealth.
Ultimately, and much like the American Wild West, the
region’s security will depend on the ability of the
Guatemalan State to develop and implement a national
development strategy that seeks to enhance the quality of life
for the citizens of Petén and its surrounding departments.
Only once the State makes the reassertion of its presence and
functions a strategic priority, will the narcotraffickers finally
be rendered unable to gain the loyalty of local populations.
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